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Toward a Law of Damages
Robert J. Nordstrom
The concepts explored herein will be incorporated in the first chapter
of a textbook on damages which Professor Nordstrom is co-authoring and
will help to place the prevailing law of damages in historical perspective.
After tracing the development of damage theories from pre-Roman times
in which reparation for a wrongfully inflicted injury took the form of
"outlawry" to the present-day ad hoc determination of monetary relief,
the author sets forth the rationale for the Anglo-American jurisprudential
commitment to the principle of compensation rather than punishment,
to the flexibility of jury awards, and to control by courts over unreason-
able jury verdicts.
THE MODERN LAWYER accepts, with but few questions, a
legal system in which relief by way of compensatory damages
is the norm.1 Those questions which are raised usually focus on
a comparison of the benefits of specific reliee with those of a mone-
tary award; from time to time,
cases and statutes suggest that
THE AUTHOR (A.B., Western Michigan
University, J.D., University of Michi- i particular situations specific
gan) is a Professor of Law at Ohio State relief is to be preferred to dam-
University College of Law, and his teach- ages? However, these sugges-
ing specialties include Contracts, Restitu-
tion, and Sales. tions do not challenge the role
of compensatory damages as
the basic remedy in the vast
number of tort and contract actions. Nor is such a challenge made
1 The term "compensatory damages" is generally reserved to denote money recov-
eries measured, in contract actions, by the expected gains from the contract and, in tort
actions, by the losses that had been sustained by the injured party either personally or
through his property interests. See McCoRMicK, DAMAGES 560-62 (1935); PROSSER,
TORTS §§ 1-6 (3d ed. 1964). See also the arrangement of volumes 5 and 5A CORBIN,
CONTRACTS (1964) and the arrangement of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS S 327-57(1932). However, for the purpose of this article, the term "compensatory damages"
is considered more broadly so as to include all monetary recoveries, other than those
designed to punish the wrongdoer, which are measured either as indicated above or by
restitutionary or reliance interests. There is at least this justification for the broader
usage: none of these recoveries has as its primary purpose the punishment of the wrong-
doer. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46
YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
2 The one area in which specific relief is given as a matter of course involves the
enforcement of contracts for the sale of land. Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 545, 11
N.W. 732 (1882) (suit by the purchaser); Spring v. Sanders, 62 N.C. 67 (1866)
(suit by the vendor). See cases cited in 5A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 1143,
1145 (1964).
3 See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-716(1), comment 1, which asserts
that "this Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts have shown
in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale." Comment 2 to the
same section expands this idea.
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in this article, because the concept of awarding compensatory dam-
ages for the wrongful invasion of a legal right represents both ma-
turity and wisdom in a legal system.
I. FRoM OUTLAWRY TO BOT
Undoubtedly, every civilization has worked out some method
for granting a kind of relief to a person who was injured through
the wrongful activity of another. These civilizations, with their dif-
fering mores, have disagreed as to what constituted a "wrongful
activity";4 they also employed what now appear to be rather crude
types of relief. Sometimes, early relief was by way of outlawry -
that is, the person who was guilty of that which society defined as an
unlawful activity was literally outside the law, and anyone in the
community could seek vengeance against the guilty party without
fear of punishment by the law.' Gradually, outlawry was replaced
by pecuniary payments made by the wrongdoer to satisfy the
wronged person's right of revenge.6 This procedure developed
into a system of relief by penalty, in which the performance of a
proscribed act called for a prescribed payment to the injured. Since
money was uncommon, the payment was often in terms of chattels.7
A. Impact of Roman Law
The Romans developed an elaborate legal system which incuded
4 Examples can be found in any book on primitive customs and laws. See CHERRY,
THE GROWTH OF CRadmAL LAW IN ANCIENT COMMUNITEs (1890). An inter-
esting provision from the Code of Hammurabi (5 110) illustrates the different mores
of that civilization: "If a votary [probably, woman) open a tavern, or enter a tavern
for the purpose of drinking, that woman shall be burnt to death." Quoted in 1 Ko-
couREK & WIGMORE, SOURcEs OF ANciENT AND PRimnvE LAw 408 (1915).
5 "Primitive law could not measure its blows; he who defied the law was outside
it. An outlaw was treated as a wild beast whom any man might slay. He had ceased
to be a member of the community because he failed to observe its laws. Such a pun-
ishment represents an early stage in the life of a community." POTTER, HISTOICAL
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 347 (4th ed. 1958).- "He who breaks the law has
gone to war with the community; the community goes to war with him. It is the right
and duty of every man to pursue him, to ravage his land, to burn his house, to hunt
him down like a wild beast and slay him .... " 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 449 (2d ed. 1923). See also CHERRY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 8.
6 In book IX of Homer's Iliad, Aias says to Achilles: "Yet doth a man accept rec-
ompense of his brother's murderer or for his dead son; and so the man-slayer for a
great price abideth in his own land, and the kinsman's heart is appeased and his proud
soul, when he hath taken the recompense."
7
"f a man steal an ox, or sheep, or ass, or pig, or boat, from a temple or palace,
he shall pay thirty-fold; if it be from a freeman, he shall pay tenfold." Code of Ham-
murabi 5 8, quoted in 1 KOCouTEEK & WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 391. "If a
man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an
ox, and four sheep for a sheep." Exodus 22:1.
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provisions for the awarding of damages to those who had been in-
jured. This development occurred over several centuries and was
extended throughout the various cultures of Europe. Therefore, it
is impossible to present accurately the rules of damages under Ro-
man law except by tracing their historical growth as modified in
the various geographical areas in which the rules were applied.
However, in many ways the approach of the Romans to the prob-
lem of damages approximates some of our present principles. For
example, in the law of obligations, recovery was sometimes allowed
for both the immediate injury (called damnum emergens) and
for consequential injury, such as loss of profits (called lacrum ces-
sans).' In other situations, the Roman approach to damages was
substantially different from that of the present-day American court.
For some delictual actions, the recovery was primarily penal, with a
sum of money being paid to the injured party (in addition to restora-
tion of any property taken) as a ransom to free the wrongdoer.'
Although the study of the Roman law of money recoveries is a
rewarding effort, a detailed presentation is unnecessary for the pur-
poses of this article. The primary reason for so summarily dismiss-
ing these many centuries of legal growth is that they had little
direct influence on the shaping of Anglo-American law. The fall of
the Roman empire also marked the fall of the Roman legal system,
and only a few of its ideas of law, including damages, were trans-
ported into England. Instead, the same process of growth had to
be repeated in England over several additional centuries, and al-
though this growth in many ways paralleled that of Rome, it de-
veloped without the benefit of countless lessons which could have
been learned through a careful study of Roman history.' °
8 LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 394 (4th ed. 1956).
9 NIcHOLAs, ROMAN LAw 209 (1962); RADIN, ROMAN LAW 127 (1927). The
Romans also had an interesting method of valuing some property injuries. The high-
est value during a prior relatively long period of time was selected. For example, if
a slave or four-footed beast was wrongfully killed, the wrongdoer was required to pay
the owner the highest value during the year prior to the killing. 2 MUrNRO, THE DI-
GEST OF JUSTINIAN 117 (1909) (translation of DIGEST 9.2.2). See the interpreta-
tion of this provision in LEE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 393-98. Thus, if the slave had
suffered a disabling accident within the year prior to the wrongful killing, "damages"
to the owner for the killing would be computed on the basis of the value of that slave
prior to the disabling injury.
10 There was a period during the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries when
a study of Roman law appears to have influenced the English lawyers at the royal court.
From that point on, the Roman legal background had no appreciable influence on the
development of English law. 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 177 (3d
ed. 1923). However, it was during the twelfth century (ca. 1166) that the assize of
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B. Early Forms of Anglo-American Monetary Payments
The Anglo-American law of damages had its beginnings in
the customs and orders of the Anglo-Saxons, well before the Nor-
man Conquest in 1066 A.D. These customs and orders once pro-
vided for the practice of outlawry for civil wrongs, a practice com-
mon to all early "legal" systems.1 There were also feuds - a re-
finement of outlawry - in which the law allowed only the in-
jured person or his family to wage private war on the wrongdoer.
Fairly definite rules evolved concerning feuds and as to what mem-
bers of the wrongdoer's family were either inside or outside of
the law's protection. Gradually, an amount of money was set
to atone for the wrong done, but at first there was no requirement
that the wrongdoer pay the amount. He could, at his option,
either continue the feud or pay the money. 2  However, prob-
ably first by social pressure and then through public decree, these
amounts of money (called wer, wite, or bot)'8 became accepted in
place of outlawry for most civil wrongs. A growing number of
wrongs were atoned for by the payment of bot to the person
harmed; nevertheless, if the wrongdoer either would not or could
not pay the fixed amount, outlawry remained as punishment.'4
The bot was not, however, the equivalent of what is today called
damages because the scale of payment was fixed. There could be no
dispute over the amount to be awarded. In this sense, the recovery
was penal. An example of this type of money recovery can be found
in the laws of Ethelbert (ca. 600) which carefully specified the bot
novel disseisin was instituted. This was probably the earliest action in which damages
could be sought. One writer has indicated that this assize was an adaptation of an
older Roman interdict. See Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (pts.
1-2), 33 YALE LJ. 799 (1924), 34 YALE L.J. 343 (1925).
11 PLUcKNT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAw 385 (5th ed. 1956).
The process of outlawry was also used to compel the defendant to submit to the juris-
diction of the court, the courts having only doubtful authority over defendants not ac-
tually appearing in the case. If the defendant continued to absent himself from the
court, outlawry was used as a sanction against him. Outlawry was also used in crim-
inal proceedings as a penalty for violent resistance to legal process or persistent contempt
of court. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 49.
121 d. at 48.
13 There was a technical distinction between the wer, the wite, and the hot. The
wer (or weregild) was the value set on a man's life; the wite was the penal fine paid
to a public authority; and the bot was the general word which included compensation
of any kind. A wrong which could not be atoned by the payment of money was called
botleas. See ibid.
14 See 2 id. at 449-51.
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to be paid for each injury. 5 Professor Ames captured the spirit of
these early measures of recovery in this manner:
The pecuniary compensations and fines are set forth with great
precision and minuteness in the Salic law. One could tell to a
shilling just what it would cost to kill one's neighbor's cow, or
even the neighbor himself. If the latter was a free man the com-
pensation was two hundred shillings; if a slave, twenty-five shil-
lings; if a royal official, six hundred shillings. Similarly there was
a fixed price for a broken nose or an eye knocked out.16
II. THE GROWTH OF THE JURY SYSTEM AS AN
INFLUENCE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
Contemporaneous with the Anglo-Saxon culture and prior to
the Norman Conquest, there was an event taking place in the con-
tinental palace of the Frankish Kings which would affect the growth
of the law of damages. Those rulers called into their "courts" a
group of men to be used as counsel in many different matters, in-
duding litigation. At first these groups of men apparently were
used only to establish royal prerogatives; however, when the prac-
tice was transplanted to England following the Norman Conquest,
these groups became juries, and their role gradually changed
from that of counsellors to the Frankish kings to that of protectors
of the public.1"
15 If a shoulder be lamed, let bot be made with XXX shillings.... If an
ear be struck off, let bot be made with XII shillings.... If the other ear hear
not, let bot be made with XXV shillings.... If an ear be pierced, let bot be
made with III shillings .... If an ear be mutilated, let hot be made with VI
shillings .... If an eye be (struck) out, let bot be made with L shillings ....
If a mouth or an eye be injured, let bot be made with XII shillings .... If
the nose be pierced let bot be made with IX shillings.... If it be one ala let
bot be made with III shillings.... If both be pierced, let bot be made with
VI shillings.... If the nose be otherwise mutilated, for each let bot be made
with VI shillings .... If it be pierced, let hot be made with VI shillings.
Quoted in POUND & PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HIsToRY AND Sys-
TEMOF THE COMMON LAW 46 (3d ed. 1927).
Further sections set a price for the chin-bone, front teeth, back teeth, speech, collar
bone, a thumb, a thumb nail, shooting finger, as well as for stabbing through an arm,
the breaking of an arm, disfigurement of the face, bruises, bruises covered by clothes,
bruises not covered by clothes, and so on. There is no question but that the modern
lawyer would have an interesting time attempting to construe some of these sections as
they applied to specific injuries.
16AMEs, LECTUREs ON LEGAL HISTORY 39 (1913). See also I SEDGWIcKDAM-
AGES 6-10 (9th ed. 1913).
17 It was earlier thought that the jury was of Anglo-Saxon origin. However, the
studies - particularly of Brunner - indicate that this is not the case and that the
Frankish inquisitio was undoubtedly the forerunner of the English and American jury.
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 140-42. The twelve thegns of An-
glo-Saxon law may have been the origin of the grand jury but not the petit jury. POT-
TEE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 240.
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A. Money Payments as Compromises
There is no need to trace the history of the jury, for this has been
admirably done by other writers. 8 It is sufficient to point out that,
up to the twelfth century, the juries which were used had no control
over the recovery of damages. The reason was simple: there was
no action through which damages could be recovered. Specific re-
lief and outlawry could be decreed, but there was no form of action
for asking the jury to set damages. It is true that many lawsuits re-
sulted in the defendant paying money to the plaintiff, but these
payments were by way of compromise - that is, after the court di-
rected the defendant to do a certain act, the parties "compromised"
by substituting a money payment for the court decree. Evidently, this
practice of compromising had judicial sanction. The following
case is reported in the Shropshire Eyre in 1203:
Sibil, Engelard's daughter, appeals Ralph of Sanford, for that
he in the king's peace and wickedly and in breach of the peace
given to her in the county [court] by the sheriff, came to the
house of her lord for husband] and broke her chests and carried
off the chattels, and so treated her that he slew the child that was
living in her womb.
-Afterwards she came and said that they had made a compro-
mise and she withdrew herself, for they have agreed that Ralph
shall satisfy her for the loss of the chattels upon the view and by
the appraisement of lawful men; and Ralph has assented to this.19
Notice how the result of this litigation differs from the payment of
bot and how it approximates the result which would be reached
today, at least as to property loss. The compromise gave Sibil the
value of the chattels. However, the determination of value was not
controlled by the court but was left to an outside appraisement.
B. Original Actions for Damages
It will undoubtedly never be known what the first action for
damages was. People in those early centuries were not interested
in leaving a written record of their efforts. However, there is sub-
stantial evidence that the action for damages resulted from an action
created by the assize of novel disseisen, instituted in the middle of
the twelfth century (ca. 1166).2o This assize provided for a recov-
Is See PLUCKNErT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 106-38; POUND & PLUCKNETr, op.
cit. supra note 15, at 134-77; THAYER, EvIDENcE AT THE CommoN LAW 47-262
(1898).
19 1 SELEcT PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32 (No. 73).
20 Woodbine, supra note 10, 33 YALE LU. at 807, 34 YALE L.U. at 343.
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ery of possession of land as well as of chattels connected with the
land. When the chattels could not be restored, damages were
awarded as an alternative.21
The use of damages as a remedy soon spread to other forms
of action, chief among which were the various types of trespass
actions which, in turn, were probably related to the assize of novel
disseisen.22 With the widespread use of these actions, the courts
possessed nearly all of the tools which were needed to develop dam-
ages as the normal basis for judicial relief. The wer and the bot of
the Anglo-Saxons had suggested the concept of using money rather
than the feud to assuage the wronged; actions seeking money re-
covery had been initiated and developed by the court; the jury was
available to introduce flexibility into the determination of the
amount of money to be awarded; and, perhaps through the com-
promise, the basis of recovery was shifting from that of punishment
to that of compensation. All that remained was the need for a
control over verdicts so that the judicial system could have a rea-
sonable assurance that juries would seek to compensate the injured
person rather than to punish either of the parties.
C. Dual Function Served by the Jury
The jury of the early middle ages performed functions substan-
tially different from those of the twentieth century petit jury. The
medieval jury was one of both trial and accusation and could also be
called together when the king wanted information. For example,
the early jurors might be asked to name all of the land owners in their
district and to list the amount of land owned by each. 3 Juries of
this time are generally described as "twelve lawful knights."'24  For
the grand assize, they were elected by four knights who had been
summoned by the sheriff, whereas for the petty assizes, the jurors
were selected by the sheriff without the intervention of electors.
These jurors were not expected to reach an objective verdict based
solely upon the evidence presented by witnesses of the parties' choos-
21 POTTBR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 354.
22 For other theories as to the origin of the action of trespass, See PLUCKNETT, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 369-72.
23 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, OP. cit. supra note 5, at 139.
2 4 See 2 i. at 621-22. Calling the jury "twelve lawful knights" represents a later
development in the history of juries, because not all of the first juries were composed
of twelve men. In the early middle ages, there appears to have been no set number
for the jury. There is evidence of juries with as few as nine and as many as eighty-four
jurors. PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 120; THAYER, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 86.
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ing. Instead, the medieval jury was a body of neighbors, many of
whom had first-hand knowledge of the transaction involved. They
rendered their verdict not only on the basis of what they heard and
saw in court (there often were some outside witnesses testifying as to
portions of the transaction) but also on the basis of their own knowl-
edge and, sometimes, independent investigation. Thus, these jurors
performed both a witnessing and a judging function. 5
At first the trial jury, as distinguished from the accusing or in-
forming jury, was probably used to determine whether the complain-
ant or the defendant had the greater right to a certain piece of land
the title to which was in dispute.26 However, as trespass actions began
to result in damage recoveries, the jury was used to set the amount
of damages. Because the juries were acquainted with the facts and be-
cause no attempt had been made to present witnesses who testified as
to the entire transaction, there was no basis for the trial judge or for
the appellate courts to revise an award of damages which was claimed
to be either insufficient or excessive. The jury of the middle ages
was no longer simply an advisor as to the amount of damages;
courts had come to consider jurors as "chancellors" as to the amount
of damages to be awarded in a law suit.2
III. PRINCIPAL FORCES CONTROLLING THE JURY VERDICT
Despite statements by judges as to the supremacy of the jury in
determining damages, there were two principal forces which tended
to control the verdict. One of these was the process of attaint which
was widely employed during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
25 2 REEVES, HISTORY Op ENGLISH LAW 118-35 (New Am. ed. 1880). TH-AYER,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 90 passim. These jurors were "witnesses" who had been
selected (at least indirectly) solely by the court;, they were not chosen by the parties.
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 622-26. Further, the twelfth cen-
tury jury did not "judge," in that its decision (which did not need to be unanimous,
see THAYER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 86) was probably only advisory to the court.
I POLLocK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 139-40.
26 For example, a 1200 case involved a claim to "one hide of land with appurten-
ances in Morland" by Galiena against her brother, William. Galiena claimed the land
descended from her mother and not from the side of her father. Forty shillings were of-
fered by Galiena to the king to have a jury determine whether the land "ought to de-
scend to her from her mother's side, or to William from his father's side." The jury
decided in favor of Galiena and the order was: "Let Galiena have her seisen thereof.".
1 SELECT CIVIL PLEAS 1 (No. 1).
2 71ixt v. Goats, 1 Rolle 257 (K.B. 1615). There is another theory as to why
jury verdicts became binding on the courts. Jury trial was only one of competing
methods of trial. When the parties agreed to "put themselves on the country" (that
is, to submit the case to the jury) rather than, for example, to wage their law, they
had made a binding election. The judges could not then change the method of trial.
See discussion of this theory in 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 623.
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but which gradually fell into disuse during the later centuries; the
second was a growing reaction that there should be some legal prin-
ciples against which the amount of damages awarded could be
tested. This second force, of which is found only traces in the early
cases, survived the changing function of the jury and became, by the
eighteenth century, the basis for a law of damages.
A. Criminal Punishment of Jurors Through Attaint
One of the most interesting relics from legal history is the proc-
ess of attaint to control a jury's decision. While there were dif-
ferent ways in which to convict the jury of having reached a false
decision,28 the one most often described, and thus probably the most
often used, was that of calling twenty-four other jurors who would
reconsider the original case.29 If they found that the first jury of
twelve had reached a false verdict, that verdict was set aside
and the first jury punished. The jurors were thrown into prison,
their lands and goods were seized by the king, and they were
"branded with perpetual infamy."8  Fortesque reports in even
stronger (and more colorful) language by remarking that if it was
found that the original panel made a false oath,
every one of the first Jury shall be committed to the King's prison,
their goods shall be confiscated, their possessions seized into the
King's hands, their habitations and houses shall be pulled down,
their wood-lands shall be felled, their meadows shall be plowed up
and they themselves ever thenceforward be esteemed, in the eye of
the law, infamous, and in no case whatsoever are they to be ad-
mitted in testimony of the truth; the party who suffered in the for-
mer trial, shall be restored to everything he lost through occasion
of such false verdict.3 '
While this appears to be a rather stern penalty for a jury reach-
ing a decision which was later determined to be erroneous, there is
28 2 REEVEs, op. cit. supra note 25, at 161-66.
2 9 An early reported.case involving attaint was tried at Lincolnshire Eyre in 1202.
Hugh and Robert disputed seisin to a parcel of land in Withern. The jury determined
that Hugh should "have his seisen, and Robert is in mercy for the unjust detention.
Robert offers to the King forty shillings to have the oath of twenty-four knights
to convict the jurors." 1 SELECr PLEAS OF THE CROWN 88 (No. 216). An even
earlier case is Gundulf v. Pichot, decided some time between 1066 and 1087. The
case is reported in BIGELOW, PLACITA ANGLO NORMANNICA 34 (1879), and dis-
cussed in THAYER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 51-52.
802 REE Es, op. cit. supra note 25, at 165.
81 Chapter 26 of FORTESQuE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE (ca. 1468), trans-
lated by Gregor and appearing in revised version in POUND & PLUCKNETr, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 159.
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theoretical justification for criminal punishment of jurors in a sys-
tem in which the jurors also performed a witness function. In
effect the punishment was for perjury. As the nature of the jury's
function changed to that of fact determination and as the witness
function was dropped, the process of attaint became inapplicable
and gradually disappeared from English law. There was also an
understandable reluctance on the part of the second jury to impose
such a harsh penalty on their neighbors. Therefore, certainly by
the sixteenth century, attaint was no longer an effective control of
juries.
The attaint did not build any body of principles which could
be described even generally as a law of damages. The attainting
jury acted from its own knowledge, as had the first jury, and was
not bound to follow any instructions from the judge. Because the
second jury could not, in turn, be attainted, its decision was final.
Furthermore, attaint was limited to decreasing an excessive damage
verdict; it could not be used to challenge an inadequate award.8"
The lasting effect, then, of the process of attaint was severely re-
stricted, although its threat was probably very real during at least the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
B. "Cognizance" as the Basis of Judicial Review
The date when a law of damages began to appear is subject to
honest dispute. However, it is most probable that such a body of
principles can loosely be traced to an idea of "cognizance." Briefly
stated, that idea was this: if the injury was in the sole cognizance of
the jury (for example, injury to land which had been viewed by the
juror-witnesses and could not be seen by the judge), the jury's de-
termination would not be revised by the judge. In such a case,
attaint was the only relief for an excessive verdict and, as has
been pointed out, this possibility did not hold out much hope for
the defendant. If, instead, the injury was one which could also be
viewed by the judge (as an injury to the person with the person
being brought into court), the judge could revise an excessive ver-
dict. Many early cases illustrate this idea, but a representive one
will suffice. In 1622, an action was decided in King's Bench in-
volving what today is termed slander.'S The suit arose from the
32 For an excellent article concerning the growth of the law of damages and the influ-
ence which attaint played in this growth, see Washington, Damages in Contrat at Com-
mon Law, 47 LQ. REv. 345 (1931).
3 3 Hawkins v. Scie, Palmer 314, 81 Eng. Rep. 1099 (K.B. 1622). The case is
quoted from BEALEz, CASES ON DAMAGES 2 (3d ed. 1928).
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
defendant's having falsely called the plaintiff a bankrupt, and the
jury awarded the plaintiff £150 in damages. After stating these
facts, the opinion continues:
[AInd for this great damage the court, by reason of certain cir-
cumstances, reduced them [the damages] to £50. But afterwards,
upon great consideration, they revoked this, and would not change
the course of the law; and resolved to leave such matters of fact to
the finding of the jury, which better knows the quality of the per-
sons and their estate, and the damage that they may sustain by such
disgrace. Otherwise where the action is grounded on a cause
which may appear in the sight of the court, so that they may judge
of it, as in mayhem, &c. And so is Dyer, 105. And therefore
they give judgment on the verdict for £150.s4
Here is a requirement that the determiner of damages have cer-
tain knowledge (that is, cognizance) of the amount of damages. With
the passage of time, this requirement was reshaped, finally to be-
come a principle that the amount of damages must be proved
with certainty to the trier of fact - "certainty" being defined more
strictly in contract actions than in tort actionsa - and one of the
first "rules" of damages emerged."6
C. Granting of a New Trial as a Control Over the Jury
The method by which this rule of cognizance developed only
roughly parallels the development of legal rules today. The
seventeenth-century court was less concerned with searching out
general principles of law than it was with seeking some method of
controlling jury verdicts, since attaint had all but disappeared. 7 The
principal method finally devised was the granting of a new trial be-
fore a new jury.38
The granting of new trials is today commonplace, but the
34 Ibid.
35The language of cognizance of the jury was repeated in Wilford v. Berkeley, 1
Burr. 609, 97 Eng. Rep. 472 (K.B. 1758), a criminal conversation case. The jury
had awarded the plaintiff an amount which was ten times the defendant's annual sal-
ary, but a new trial was denied. In 1774, Common Pleas stated: "In contract the
measure of damages is generally matter of account, and the damages given may be dem-
onstrated to be right or wrong. But in torts a greater latitude is allowed to the jury:
and the damages must be excessive and outrageous to require or warrant a new trial."
Sharpe v. Brice, 2 Bla. W. 942 (C.P. 1774).
36 This growth is traced in Washington, supra note 32, at 351-66.
37
"Though the field of damages was one of several where the lack was felt most
severely, the whole development of the common law system was hampered and retarded
for want of some simple and effective means of controlling the jury." Id. at 358.
38 The history of granting a new trial is traced in THAYER, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 168-82.
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acquisition of that power by early courts, especially in damage
cases, required considerable ingenuity on the part of the seven-
teenth century lawyer. The difficulty centered upon the fact that
jurors still served the dual role of witnesses and judges. Jurors
were allowed to act on evidence about which the court knew noth-
ing." However, a new trial had been granted in Wood v. Gun-
ston40 for an award which the defendant claimed was excessive.
Although the Wood case cautiously added that "indirect dealings"
may cause the jury to side with one party rather than being "indif-
ferent betwixt them"41 and although the decision was made during
the period of the Commonwealth, the idea of granting a new trial
was to become one of the principal devices for controlling jury
verdicts. Thus, in 1757, Lord Mansfield, noting that attaint had
become a "mere sound" in every case, and in many cases did not
even pretend to be a remedy, concluded that "It is absolutely nec-
essary to justice, that there should, upon many occasions, be oppor-
tunities of reconsidering the cause by a new trial."4"
D. Development of Basic Principles Regarding the Amount
of Damages
With the development of the power to award new trials and
with the addition of other controls over juries, notably rules of
evidence and jury instruction, the court was in a position to develop
principles relating to the amount of damages which could be
recovered. These principles did not come quickly. The lawyer
and the court were still operating under a writ system in which the
attention of the common law lawyers was directed toward matters
which today would be called procedural; they did not think in terms
of substantive law. Thus, neither the lawyer presenting the case
nor the judge deciding it was particularly concerned about devel-
oping general principles applicable to the measurement of dam-
ages. However, as the writ system lost its hold on the courts and
as the power to grant new trials became generally accepted in the
legal system, lawyers began to think in terms of legal principles
3 9 Bushel's Case, Vaughn 135 (CP. 1670).
40 Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (Upper Bench 1655).
41 Ibid.
42 Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 393, 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 366 (K.B. 1757).
43 1 WiGMORE, EvIDENcE §§ 4, 8 (3d ed. 1940); THAYER, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 112.
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applicable to large groups of cases.44 It was at this time that a law
of damages began to emerge.
IV. FORMULATION OF GENERAL DAMAGE RULES
A. Breach of Contract
Suits involving breach of a contract promise were among the
early cases in which the court sought to state general damage
rules. At first it was indeterminable whether the nonbreaching party's
expectation interest or his restitution interest merited primary pro-
tection. In Flureau v. Thornhill," the plaintiff agreed to purchase
real estate46 and paid in advance twenty percent of the purchase
price. When tide was checked, a defect was discovered which evi-
dently could not be removed. The plaintiff sued for the down pay-
ment - which the seller was quite willing to return, having pre-
viously tendered the down payment and interest into court - and
"insisted on a farther sum for damages in the loss of so good a
bargain."" The jury, contrary to the court's instructions, awarded
damages for the plaintiff's loss of bargain. In granting a new
trial, the court formulated this rule:
De Grey, C. J. - I think the verdict wrong in point of law.
Upon a contract for a purchase, if the tide proves bad, and the
vendor is (without fraud) incapable of making a good one, I do
not think that the purchaser can be entitled to any damages for the
fancied goodness of the bargain, which he supposes he has lost....
Blackstone, J., of the same opinion. - These contracts are
merely upon condition, frequently expressed, but always implied,
that the vendor has a good tide. If he has not, the return of the
deposit, with interest and costs, is all that can be expected.48
There are many interesting ideas in these sentences: (1) The
court made no attempt to give reasons for its conclusion; justifica-
tion was to come nearly a century later, long after the Flureau
rule had become firmly imbedded in English law.49 (2) Justice
44 PLUCKNEITr, op. cit. supra note 11, at 353-82.
452 Bla. W. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776).
46 Plaintiff (the buyer) purchased at auction a rent for a term of thirty-two years
arising out of a leasehold. The price was £270 (stated as £207 in one place in the
report), of which plaintiff paid £54 down.
47 2 Bla. W. at 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. at 635.
48 Ibid.
4 9 Bain v. Fothergill, L.R. 7 H.L. 158 (1874). One justification for continuing
the rule of Flureau v. Thornhill was the practice of conveyancers and "the common
dealings of mankind." However, Lord Hatherly also relied on the unsatisfactory con-
ditions of titles in England, and this may have been the basis on which Blackstone sug-
gested his implied condition.
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Blackstone's use of the doctrine of implied condition to limit the
scope of a promise arose during a period when English courts were
reappraising and formulating a doctrine of implied conditions." (3)
The statement "fancied goodness of the bargain" is explainable when
considered in relation to the plaintiff's approach to recovery. The
loss of bargain which the plaintiff sought to recover was evidently
not the difference between the market value of the real estate and
the contract price but was, instead, the difference between the sell-
ing price of stock (which the plaintiff had liquidated in order to
make the purchase) at the time of the sale and the price of that
stock at the time the plaintiff learned that the defendant did not
have good tide to the real estate.51 (4) The "without fraud" limita-
tion has given this general rule of damages a flexibility which has
been used to suggest substantial restriction of the rule's application.52
Nevertheless, the court's choice of protecting the restitution rather
than the expectation interest when a vendor is unable to convey a
good title has left its imprint on this type of case, both in England
and in this country."m
The plaintiff's contract expectation interest was not overlooked.
The judges were of the opinion that some method had to be found
to frame a general principle which would explain when a nonde-
faulting party could recover those gains which he would have made
had the contract been performed. The idea of "certainty" was
available, but this was a hindsight test. If the nondefaulting
party could prove his losses with certainty (whatever this term
might mean54), should the defaulting party be liable for those losses
50 See Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (K.B. 1773); Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. BI. 273,
126 Eng. Rep. 160 (1777).
51 A portion of Blackstone's opinion dealt with this problem but concluded: "Not
that this is material; for the plaintiff had a chance of gaining as well as losing by a
fluctuation of the price." 2 Bla. W. at 1079, 96 Eng. Rep. at 636.
52 MCCOlMICK, DAMAGES 689-91 (1935).
5 3 The English cases are discussed in MAYNE & McGREGOR, DAMAGES 393-411
(12th ed. 1961). Cases from the United States are summarized in 5 CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1098 (1964). See Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374 (1870), for an
application of Flureau v. Thornhill.
An attempt to state a general rule for restitution protection came sixteen years be-
fore the Flureau decision in Moses v. Maderlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.
1760). There, Lord Mansfield explained the basis of quasi-contractual recovery in
the setting of "the ties of natural justice." Id. at 1009, 97 Eng. Rep. at 678. Efforts
to make restitution rules definite have defied the scholarship of two hundred years.
DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMaNT passim (1951).
54 A casual reading of damage cases might lead to the conclusion that damages
must be proved with a type of mathematical exactness. The law requires no such heavy
burden. In this regard, see, e.g., UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 824 (1954); Noble v. Tweedy, 90 Cal. App. 2d 738, 203 P.2d 778.
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even if he had no way reasonably to anticipate that those losses
would result from a breach? At first, the answer appeared to
be in the affirmative. 5 However, in the middle of the nineteenth
century another step was taken to give the judges further control
over the verdicts of juries. In the famous Hadley v. Baxendale"6
decision, Baron Alderson remarked:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in re-
spect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to
the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contem-
plation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it.57
Once again a jury verdict was set aside for a new trial, perhaps even
at the expense of misreading the facts of the case.58
(1949); Naeger v. Naeger, 339 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. App. 1960). "It is sufficient if a
reasonable basis of computation is afforded, although the result be only approximate."
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927). See
also Wright v. Ickenroth, 215 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. App. 1948). The principle of certainty
should be nothing more than a statement about the provability of a claim used to con-
trol verdicts based upon speculation. See cases cited in 22 AM. JrR. 2D Damages 5
22 (1965).
55Black v. Baxendale, 1 Ex. 410, 154 Eng. Rep. 174 (1847). In that case a
carrier delayed in shipping goods. No notice had been given to the carrier that it
was necessary that the goods arrive at a certain time. The jury returned a verdict for
the damages caused by the delay. The carrier moved for a new trial on the ground
that the carrier had no notice of the purpose for which the goods were sent, but the mo-
tion was denied. "Parke, B. I think there ought to be no rule. The defendants are
responsible only for reasonable consequences of their breach. It was a question for the
jury whether it was reasonable and proper to send a man down to Bedford to look after
the goods." Id. at 411, 154 Eng. Rep. at 175.
589 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
57Id. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
58 The head-note [to Hadley v. Baxe idale is definitely misleading in so far
as it says that the defendant's clerk, who attended at the office, was told that
the mill was stopped and that the shaft must be delivered immediately. The
same allegation figures in the statement of facts which are said on page 344
to have "appeared" at the trial before Crompton J. If the Court of Exchequer
had accepted these facts as established, the court must, one would suppose,
have decided the case the other way round; must, that is, have held the damage
claimed was recoverable under the second rule. But it is reasonably plain
from Alderson B's judgment that the court rejected this evidence. Victoria
Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Indus. Ltd. [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 537
(CA.), restating the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.
See 5 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 53, 55 1006-13, for an analysis of the foreseeability
doctrine. The value of the Hadley v. Baxendale decision lies not in any requirement of
actual foreseeability of special harm, but in its basic premise that not all losses are to be
shifted from this plaintiff to this defendant. The case is an excellent example of the
increasing control of courts over the discretion of juries. Other statements of the rule
have appeared in this country: Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540
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B. Tort Actions
Damage rules were also being developed in the area which
lawyers now refer to as torts.5" The suggestion from Shropshire
Eyre in 12030 that the owner of converted goods should be
compensated by an award of the market value of those goods has
been accepted as the standard measure of recovery. Personal injury
actions - damages for which once lay in the particular ken of the
jury - are now the subject of many damage rules."' These rules
are based generally upon a notion of compensation, even when the
loss sustained and the money awarded can not be equivalent. 2
V. CONCLUSION
The characteristic problems of each generation have exerted
influence in shaping damage awards. Widespread use of auto-
mobiles as well as the impact of income taxes have had their
effect on damage rules in mid-twentieth-century tort cases.' The
implementation of the Uniform Commercial Code contract rem-
edies concerning the sale of goods will require court attention in
the last half of the century.64 In meeting these challenges, courts
will continue to use those principles which have been developing
ever since the idea was conceived that there ought to be a better
way to settle disputes than by outlawry.' The principle of
compensation rather than punishment, the flexibility of the jury
award, and control by courts over the unreasonable jury verdict 65
this is the "stuff" out of which a law of damages has been fash-
ioned.
Perhaps there are legal scholars who object to labelling the
(1903); Lamkins v. International Harvester Co., 207 Ark. 637, 182 S.W.2d 203
(1944); Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 245 N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927).
59 MAYNE & McGREGoR, op. cit. supra note 53, at 565-603.
60 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
61 These rules are discussed in McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 52, at 299-334; 22
Am. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 85-130 (1965).62 Recovery for pain and suffering is an example of a situation in which the injury
and money are not in any sense the equivalents of each other; nevertheless, the law of
damages allows compensation for pain and suffering. Cases are partially collected in
Annots., 81 A.L.. 423 (1932), 85 A.L.R. 1010 (1933), 20 A.L.R.2d 276 (1951).
03See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959).
64 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § § 2-703 to -715.
65 The text has suggested only a few of the many principles of damages which have
been developed. Other examples could have been chosen from such limiting rules as
the requirement that damages be "direct" rather than "remote," the ideas of mitiga-
tion, and the doctrine of avoidable consequences. See generally McCoRMIcK, DAM-
AGES (1935).
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principles of damages as "law." There is no doubt that the applica-
tion of damage rules still rests, in many cases, in the discretion
of the jury. However, whether this body of knowledge is called
"law" or simply "principles," it is nonetheless clear that the pres-
ent Anglo-American system of awarding compensatory damages is
an immeasurable improvement over the ancient practices of out-
lawry and the inflexible concepts of wer and bot.66
6 6 The text statement contains several value judgments which could be the subject
of other artides. Workmen's compensation statutes contain strong resemblance to the
old bot concepts. However, even these statutes do not set a fixed amount for an injury
(except through maximum amounts); they establish recoveries on the basis of the em-
ployee's earnings. See, e.g., 64 N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAWS § 15; OIO REV. CODE
§ 4123.57; PA. STAT. ANN. § 513 (1952).
